extends beyond the ambit of these legislative provisions, that officer may be subject to criminal liability. 9 The authority of police to employ force, even deadly force, in effecting arrests has been subject to intense judicial, 10 as well as media scrutiny over the past few years. 
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In 2009, after the release of daunting statistics on the amount of police officers killed in the line of duty, 17 senior government officials made public declarations that seemed to promote the idea of using deadly force in combating crime. 18 This was followed by prominent cases of abuse of the power to use lethal force. 19 In fact, it has been reported that during 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 , at least 1 092 people lost their lives as a result of the use of force by the police, the highest number since the late 1990's. 20 This seems peculiar, as there were no legislative or policy amendments regarding the use of force by police during this time.
Bruce 21 argues that, in light of the fact that the very objective of a police force is to protect human life, misuse of force by police may give rise to public instability and essentially to decreased safety of police officers in carrying out their duties. Reports of misuse of force can perhaps then easily explain the spate of murdered police officers in recent years.
In light of recent controversies regarding use of force and police killings, as well as severe concerns about the difficulty in the proper interpretation of the 2003 redefined section 49, 22 an amendment to section 49 has been formulated in the shape of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill of 2010, 23 which, at the time of publication of this study, was approved by the National Assembly without assent, and is due for concurrence by the National Council of Provinces.
24
This article endeavours to investigate the desirability of the planned legislative reform. A comparative study will also be conducted to assess whether the South African legal position pertaining to use of force is in line with that of foreign jurisdictions and to facilitate the formulation of possible recommendations for favourable regulation of forceful arrests.
Understanding current legislative provisions and creating clear and efficient new laws to empower police officials to effect forceful arrests are vital in establishing legal 19 Bruce certainty, as well as providing the police with much-needed guidance in performing their sometimes very dangerous constitutional duty.
Historical development
Section 49 and its predecessors 25 have been contained in South Africa's law books for more than 165 years. 26 It is one of the most amended sections in the South African criminal procedure, having been amended four times, with a fifth amendment currently underway. 27 Due to the nature and extent thereof it has always been subject to criticism, even before the birth of the Constitution.
28
The two most significant decisions influencing the reform of the old section 49 , are
Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 29 and Ex parte Minister of Safety and
Security: in re S v Walters. 30 At the time these cases were decided, section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 31 read as follows:
49. Use of force in effecting arrest (1) If any person authorised under this Act to arrest or to assist in arresting another, attempts to arrest such person and such person-(a) resists the attempt and cannot be arrested without the use of force; or (b) flees when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him is being made, or resists such attempt and flees; the person so authorised may, in order to effect the arrest, use such force as may in the circumstances be reasonably necessary to overcome the resistance or to prevent the person concerned from fleeing.
(2) Where the person concerned is to be arrested for an offence referred to in Schedule 1 or is to be arrested on the ground that the right to equality before the law and to equal protection from the law. 41 The question arose whether these limitations passed the test of being "reasonable" and "justifiable" as set out in section 33(1) of the Interim Constitution.
42
The court, in answering the above, was of the opinion that it depended on the proper interpretation of section 49(1). 43 It is clearly the purpose of section 49 to protect the safety and security of all persons. This, however, must be brought into balance with the constitutional rights also enjoyed by the fleeing suspect.
44
The Court explained that the threshold requirement for the use of force, as previously interpreted, was extremely low. 45 It was previously raised in the case proportionality between the degree of force used by the arresting officer and the seriousness of the crime committed by the arrestee.
47
However, the appellant in the Govender-case argued that even the "raised" threshold requirement as laid down in the Matlou-decision was too low to comply with the constitutional values of reasonableness and justifiability.
48
Therefore, and with due consideration to the American case, Tennessee v Garner, 49 the court in the Govender-case expanded the proportionality requirement further and held that an additional factor to be considered was whether the suspect posed an immediate threat or danger of serious physical harm to the arresting officer, others and society as a whole.
50
The court stated that:
The words "use such force as may in the circumstances be reasonably necessary to prevent the person concerned from fleeing" in section 49(1)(b) of the Act must therefore generally speaking (there may be exceptions) be interpreted so as to exclude the use of a firearm or similar weapon unless the person authorised to arrest, or assist in arresting, a fleeing suspect has reasonable grounds for believing: 1 that the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious bodily harm to him or her, or a threat of harm to members of the public; or 2 that the suspect has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm. Section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act was accordingly deemed unconstitutional as it unjustifiably violated the rights to dignity, life and security of person. 64 However, the court was of the opinion that to simply remove section 49 (2) as shield against criminal prosecution would be against the principle of legality that does not only form part of our criminal law, but is also supported by section 35 (3)(l) of the Constitution.
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The great value of this case lies in the list of given factors to be considered by police officials when performing arrests: (1) For the purposes of this section-(a) "arrestor" means any person authorised under this Act to arrest or to assist in arresting a suspect; and (b) "suspect" means any person in respect of whom an arrestor has or had a reasonable suspicion that such person is committing or has committed an offence.
(2) If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists the attempt, or flees, or resists the attempt and flees, when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him or her is being made, and the suspect cannot be arrested without the use of force, the arrestor may, in order to effect the arrest, use such force as may be reasonably necessary and proportional in the circumstances to overcome resistance or to prevent the suspect from fleeing: Provided that the arrestor is justified in terms of this section in using deadly force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a suspect, only if he or she believes on reasonable grounds-(a) that the force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting the arrestor, any person lawfully assisting the arrestor or any other person from imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm; (b) that there is a substantial risk that the suspect will cause imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm if the arrest is delayed; or (c) that the offence for which the arrest is sought is in progress and is of a forcible and serious nature and involves the use of life threatening violence or a strong likelihood that it will cause grievous bodily harm. The requirement that the use of force must be 'reasonably necessary', is generally interpreted as meaning that whatever force used must have been the only viable alternative to guarantee a successful arrest. If any other means of carrying out the arrest was available to the arrestor, those means should have been exhausted. In addition to this, the arrestor must, before discharging a firearm at a suspect, issue a verbal warning followed by the discharge of a warning shot. In the event that this does not have the desired effect, the arrestor should direct a shot at the lower extremities of the suspect, rather than the rest of his body.
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With reference to the 'proportionality' requirement, it is clear from the Matlou-and
Govender-interpretations that the force should not only be proportional to the seriousness of the crime the suspect is thought to have committed, but also to the threat or danger the suspect poses to the arrestor, bystanders and society as a whole. This view was confirmed in the recent decision of April v Minister of Safety and Security.
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On the other hand, the second part of the 2003 redefined section 49(2) replaces the entire previous section 49(2) that was declared unconstitutional in the Walters-case and proves to be even stricter than suggested by the court in the Walters-decision. It now allows the use of deadly violence in the following circumstances:
Provided that the arrestor is justified in terms of this section in using deadly force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a suspect, only if he or she believes on reasonable grounds-(a) that the force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting the arrestor, any person lawfully assisting the arrestor or any other person from imminent or death or grievous bodily harm; (b) that there is a substantial risk that the suspect will cause imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm if the arrest is delayed; or (c) that the offence for which the arrest is sought is in progress and is of a forcible and nature and involves the use of life threatening violence or a strong likelihood it will cause grievous bodily harm. (iv) Against action that is immediately threatening or will happen in future.
According to the previous section 49(2), the arrestor was entitled to kill or seriously injure the suspect in an attempt to prevent him from fleeing, where the suspect has committed a serious offence (Schedule 1 offence) like murder, even where the conduct of the suspect when apprehended by the arrestor was not immediately threatening to the arrestor, bystanders or society as a whole, and even if there was no danger that the suspect would kill or seriously injure someone in the future. Burchell 90 raises concern about the introduction of the "future death" concept, arguing that to allow the use of deadly force where it is determined that a suspect might pose a threat in future, will only "serve to encourage a cycle of violence".
To shed some light on this ambiguity, the South African Police Service adopted a policy decision regarding the 'future death' concept. 91 A threat of future death or grievous bodily harm would exist where a suspect was reasonably thought to be a serial murderer or rapist, although proof of past robberies would not qualify a suspect as being a serial robber and therefore would be excluded from posing a future threat.
This, however, is unacceptable to the police and has been shown to lead to great confusion amongst police officers. Bruce "Shoot to kill: The use of deadly force by police" 8.
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Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure 205. 91 Geldenhuys "Shoot to kill: The use of deadly force by police" 10. The wording, 'future death', was removed from the recently amended section 49, but it is submitted that the concept thereof is still implied with the removal of the word "immediate" before threat. See below.
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Geldenhuys "Shoot to kill: The use of deadly force by police" 10. Bruce "Shoot to kill: The use of deadly force by police" 9. 96 Bruce "Shoot to kill: The use of deadly force by police" 9.
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Also referred to as the "future danger" provision and comprehensively described in Van der Walt 2011 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 141-143. without clear guidance on how to evaluate and recognise such threats. 98 Clarifying this concept is therefore vital to prevent misuse and to provide legal certainty.
Recent amendments to section 49
In an apparent effort to clarify the legal position on the use of force in arresting has [or had] a reasonable suspicion that such person is committing or has committed an offence; and (c) 'deadly force' means force that is likely to cause serious bodily harm or death and includes, but is not limited to, shooting at a suspect with a firearm.
(2) If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists the attempt, or flees, or resists the attempt and flees, when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him or her is being made, and the suspect cannot be arrested without the use of force, the arrestor may, in order to effect the arrest, use such force as may be reasonably necessary and proportional in the circumstances to overcome the resistance or to prevent the suspect from fleeing: but, in addition to the requirement that the force must be reasonably necessary and proportional in the circumstances, the arrestor may use deadly force only if - (a) the suspect poses a threat of serious violence to the arrestor or any other person; or (b) the suspect is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm and there are no other reasonable means of effecting the arrest, whether at that time or later.
The proposed Amendment Bill has been approved by the National Assembly and, at the time of publication of this article, has been submitted to the National Council of Provinces for concurrence. 101 The revised version of the Bill introduces a clarifying provision, describing 'deadly force' in section 49(1)(c):
(c) 'deadly force' means force that is likely to cause serious bodily harm or death and includes, but is not limited to, shooting at a suspect with a firearm.
Once again the first part of the 2003 redefined section 49(2) (previous 49 (1) Roux-Kemp and Horne 103 justly laments the replacement of the word "grievous" with "serious", suggesting that if one follows the strict definitions of these words, "serious" denotes a less serious situation that "grievous". This, of course, diminishes the strict criteria for use of deadly force to which the police must comply, while limiting the scope for acquiring liability. In addition to the above-mentioned amendments, the "future death" predicament has also been deleted, but it is submitted that the concept thereof is still implied with the removal of the word "immediate" before threat. If there is no need for the existence of an immediate threat, it certainly allows the use of deadly force where the suspect poses a threat at any point in time, including future threats. Once again this will be left open for a wide array of different interpretations and this may lead to serious misuse of deadly force during arrests.
In the preamble to the Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill of 2010, it is stated that the objective of the Bill is to substitute and align the provisions relating to the use of force in effecting arrests with a judgment of the Constitutional Court, namely the Walters-decision (in which the previous section 49(2) was declared unconstitutional).
When the 2003 redefined section 49(2) was formulated, the legislature did not have the benefit of making use of the guidelines as set out in the Walters-decision (as discussed above).
In drafting the proposed amendments to section 49, it seems that the legislature did little more than copy and paste from paragraph h) 105 of the guidelines provided in the Walters-decision, without grasping the background, meaning and interpretation thereof. This unavoidably lead to justified criticism against the proposed amendments by Justice Kriegler (the author of the Walters-judgment and the guidelines used by the legislature), stating that the proposed amendment broadens the circumstances under which lethal force may be allowed and are, in fact, unconstitutional.
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Although not specified as part of paragraph h) of the guidelines, it was first emphasised in the Govender-case that for the use of serious force to be justified, an immediate threat of serious bodily harm to the arrestor or the public had to exist. It was confirmed in the Walters-case "to be at the very least also the prerequisite in a 
Introduction
As is the case in South Africa, many foreign police jurisdictions occasionally struggle with the reconciliation of various demands, such as the maintenance of public order For the purposes of this article, the guidelines pertaining to the use of deadly force by police officers in the United States of America and the United Kingdom are assessed and compared to those of South Africa.
United States of America
Employment of force, especially deadly force, by members of law enforcement communities is a contentious issue in the United States of America. Constitution of the Unites States of America -The Fourth Amendment dictates the right of people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizure, to be protected against violation, and that warrants for arrests may only be issues upon probable cause to do so. The decision to use deadly force by police officials is guided by the administrative policies and regulations of each police department, or departments in a particular state. 120 In drafting these policies and regulations, authors must have due regard to the different use-of-deadly-force standards established by case law, legislation, as well as departmental, municipal and public policy. 121 Drafting authors must also determine whether the use of force, specifically deadly force, will be subject to disciplinary review whenever a firearm is merely discharged, or whether, as in the case of South Africa, review will only take place once the use of force resulted in serious injury or death.
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The least restrictive of all the standards on the use of deadly force was delineated in the Supreme Court case Tennessee v Garner. 123 This case provides for the use of deadly force against fleeing suspects, a provision that is expectedly subject to strict criteria. 124 A police officer may, under this case law, only employ deadly force against a fleeing suspect if: a) the deadly force is necessary to prevent escape, b) the suspect threatened the officer with a weapon or the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect inflicted grievous bodily harm, and c) the officer has warned the suspect of imminent use of deadly force. 125 This standard is also subject to the reasonableness requirement under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution
. 126 Prior to the decision in the Garner case, the United States applied old English common law rules allowing officers to use any means necessary, including deadly force, to arrest felony suspects or prevent them from fleeing.
127
In support of the Garner case, the U. escaping, speeding vehicle was in fact an instrument of deadly force, endangering innocent lives.
Despite the allowance in Tennessee v Garner, police officers will be held individually accountable where they deviate, even in the slightest, from the set criteria, or recent institutional or legal developments. For example, members of the police force will be held liable where they kill or injure unarmed persons they believed at the time to be armed.
129
Justification for the employment of deadly force during the execution of an arrest is provided for by section 11.05 of the Model Penal Code. The Code allows for deadly force to be used by police officers during an arrest, only when the following requirements are met: 1) the arrest is for a felony, 130 2) when the arresting officer believes that force is immediately necessary to execute the arrest or prevent the suspect from fleeing, 3) the intent of the arresting officer has been made clear to the suspect, 4) the officer believes that no substantial risk of harm exists for bystanders, 5) the officer believes that the crime committed by the suspect includes the use or threat of deadly force, and 6) that the arresting officer is of the opinion that there is substantial risk that the suspect will kill or seriously injure someone if arrest is delayed.
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The Commission of Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies in the United States crafted the so-called "defence of life standard" that dictates that law enforcement officers may employ deadly force only upon the reasonable belief that such action is in defence of life, whether his own or that of another.
132
A much more restrictive version of the "defence of life standard" employed by some dictates that a subjective test for evaluation of the reasonableness of the officer's conduct must be used. This section further reads:
Section 76 "(3)The question whether the degree of force used by D was reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided by reference to the circumstances as D believed them to be, and subsections (4) to (8) also apply in connection with deciding that question."
The Act further holds that in the determination of whether a police officer indeed held a certain belief, due regard must be given to the reasonableness of such belief. If it is determined that he indeed did subjectively embrace such belief, later proof that such belief was mistaken would be irrelevant, unless the mistake was attributable to voluntary intoxication. terrorists. These policies were referred to as Operation Kratos. officers required to interpret the regulatory provisions within a very brief decisionmaking window. It is therefore incumbent upon the governments and police authorities to provide training to those expected to enforce the law in sometimes volatile situations.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is an unobjectionable fact that the use of force, even deadly force, in effecting arrests is unavoidable in certain situations. The circumstances and degree to which it may be employed has, however, been under debate for centuries. South Africa is again on the verge of legislative changes with regards to the powers conferred to police in using force in carrying out arrests.
The acceptance and institution of changes as proposed by the Criminal Law iv) Enabling the ICD to effectively perform its oversight functions to ensure that every incident of the use of deadly force and all forms of serious misconduct are investigated and where appropriate, criminally prosecuted.
It will also be of great benefit to adopt 'standards of use of force' or internal police policies, as is the practice in the United States of America, whether nationally or provincially, in terms of which police officers must be trained and continuously informed and assisted regarding the decisions involved in the use of force while carrying out their duties. Until such pragmatic options are adopted and implemented with the full dedication and focus of police management, legislation in all forms and variations is likely to have little success.
Finally, on the issue of police safety, it has been submitted 152 that widened powers to use force during arrests will not serve to increase the safety of police officers in the line of duty. 
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